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Statutes' Domains and Judges' Prerogatives
DavidA. Strausst
INTRODUCTION

Statutory interpretation has been a principal scholarly interest of
Judge Frank Easterbrook.' But Judge Easterbrook's first entry into
the field was Statutes' Domains, an article he wrote in 1983, before he
became a judge.2 Statutes' Domains, like its author, has had an excellent career. It is widely regarded as a foundation of both public choice
and textualist approaches to issues of statutory interpretation The
themes that Judge Easterbrook developed in Statutes' Domains echo
in his later work on statutory interpretation, as well.
Statutes' Domains begins with a question: "When does a court
construe a statute, treaty, or constitutional provision and when hold it
inapplicable instead?", It is a question, Judge Easterbrook acknowledges, that "has received almost no attention from courts or scholars."s
At first glance one might think: deservedly so. If a court is going to
rule against you, why does it matter whether the court declares the
statute on which you rely to be "inapplicable" or instead "construes"
the statute in a way that is unfavorable to you?
Judge Easterbrook explains why that matters; he has a series of
answers to the question of when a declaration of inapplicability, as
t

Gerald Ratner Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law

School.
1 See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 Harv J L & Pub Pol 59, 60 (1988); Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative
History Tell Us?, 66 Chi Kent L Rev 441, 441 (1990); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and
Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 Harv J L & Pub Pol 61, 63-64 (1994); Frank H. Easterbrook, Formalism, Functionalism,Ignorance,Judges, 22 Harv J L & Pub Pol 13,15 (1998); Frank
H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 Geo Wash L Rev 1119, 1119 (1998); Frank H.
Easterbrook, JudicialDiscretionin Statutory Interpretation,57 Okla L Rev 1, 3 (2004); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Originalismand Pragmatism:Pragmatism'sRole in Interpretation,31 Harv J L &
Pub Pol 901,904 (2008).
2
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U Chi L Rev 533 (1983).
3
See, for example, Peter L. Strauss, Legislation: Understanding and Using Statutes 396,
403-07 (Foundation 2008); Note, Textualism as FairNotice, 123 Harv L Rev 542, 551-53 (2009);
Saul Levmore, Ambiguous Statutes, 77 U Chi L Rev 1073,1085-86 (2010).
4
Easterbrook, 50 U Chi L Rev at 533 (cited in note 2).

5

Id.
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opposed to a construction of the statute, is appropriate; and he has an
account of what to do when there is no applicable law. I am not sure
that all of his arguments are persuasive. But his article tells us a lot
about both the strengths and weaknesses of the influential approach
to statutory interpretation that he, as much as anyone, has pioneered.
In many respects his claims are unanswerable. But at the end of the
day, Judge Easterbrook's arguments point to a conclusion that may, I
think, be a little surprising: restricting statutes' domains in the way he
proposes means expanding judges' prerogatives.
I.ARE TWO STEPS BETTER THAN ONE?
Judge Easterbrook argues that, when a party to a case invokes a
statute, the courts should undertake a two-step inquiry. The first step is
to ask whether the statute applies to the case at all. Then, only if the
answer is yes, the second step is to interpret the statute to decide
which side it favors. Why the first step? Judge Easterbrook's explanation is that statutory interpretation can require "judicial creation or
re-creation."' That process is error-prone. But if a court "finds a statute
inapplicable to the subject of the litigation, it never begins this task of
creative construction"' -and is therefore less likely to construe the
statute incorrectly.
One difficulty with this argument is that a judge can make a mistake at the first step, too. A two-step inquiry is an improvement only if
(to put the point in economic terms) the expected error costs of the
two-step process are less than the expected error costs of a one-step,
simple construction of the statute. That will depend on how likely
judges are to conclude, mistakenly, that a statute is inapplicable, and
how damaging those mistakes are (a mistaken conclusion that a statute is applicable in effect just reverts to the one-step process). Later in
the article, Judge Easterbrook gives an account of how one might determine whether a statute is "applicable"; the process he envisions is
complex enough that mistakes are certainly possible.! So his conclusion on this point-that the two-step process is less likely to lead to
judicial error-does not seem airtight. We just do not know, in general,
whether the one-step or the two-step process will produce more (or
worse) errors.
Having said that, though, there is no question that Judge Easterbrook is on to something. There is a difference between, on the one
hand, statutes that apply to a case and must be construed and, on the
6
7

8

Id.

Id at 533-34.
Easterbrook, 50 U Chi L Rev at 552 (cited in note 2).
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other, statutes that are simply inapplicable. If a case involves, say,
pensions, and has nothing to do with water pollution, we would say that
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974' (ERISA)
might apply but that the Clean Water Act"' does not apply. We would
not ordinarily say that the Clean Water Act, properly construed, does
not help either party, although that is literally true. So the question
raised in the first sentence of Judge Easterbrook's article-when should
a court construe a statute, and when should it just conclude that the
statute is inapplicable -is a legitimate question that requires an answer.
Moreover, there is something to be learned from the implicit
premise of Judge Easterbrook's explanation of why the question is
important-that the two-stage process will introduce fewer errors (or
errors that are less bad) than the one-stage process. Judge Easterbrook's premise suggests that, in his calculations, an erroneous conclusion that a statute is inapplicable is less of a problem than an erroneous assumption of applicability, the assumption that is made in the
one-stage process. To speak imprecisely, Judge Easterbrook's premise
is that we should be less troubled by an erroneous conclusion that
leaves a matter free of legal regulation than by an error that leads to
unwarranted regulation. Later, Judge Easterbrook makes this premise
more or less explicit." That premise identifies an important issue at the
heart of Judge Easterbrook's article.
II. DEFINING A STATUTE'S DOMAIN

Judge Easterbrook proposes this approach to determining if a
statute applies to a dispute:
My suggestion is that unless the statute plainly hands courts the
power to create and revise a form of common law, the domain of
the statute should be restricted to cases anticipated by its framers
and expressly resolved in the legislative process. Unless the party
relying on the statute could establish either express resolution or
creation of the common law power of revision, the court would
hold the matter in question outside the statute's domain.'

9 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub L No 93-406,88 Stat 829, codified at 29 USC § 1001 et seq.
10 Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act ("Clean Water Act"), Pub L No 92-500,
86 Stat 816 (1972), codified at 33 USC § 1251 et seq.
11 Easterbrook, 50 U Chi L Rev at 550 (cited in note 2) (expressing hope that the "orgy of
statute making" never reaches the point at which leaving private decisions unregulated becomes
the exception).
12 Id at 544.
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Judge Easterbrook calls this a "sketch" of a rule for determining if a
statute applies, and he acknowledges that it would be "fatuous to suggest that this is the only plausible candidate."" But, he says, unless the
applicability of a statute can be established, according to these or
some other suitable criteria, "[t]he statute would become irrelevant,
the parties (and court) remitted to whatever other sources of law
might be applicable.""
These two criteria-"express resolution or creation of a common
law power of revision""-are surely plausible, but they raise some
questions, and they may lead in directions that Judge Easterbrook
does not wish to go. To say that a statute will be applicable only to
those cases that the legislature "anticipated ... and expressly resolved" raises familiar questions about the appropriate level of generality to use in interpreting statutory or constitutional provisions.
What does it mean to say that the legislature anticipated and expressly
resolved a case? Every case has many features. Obviously no legislature could anticipate every single feature. So, on Judge Easterbrook's
approach, which ones does the legislature have to have anticipated
and resolved?
Take, for example, Tennessee Valley Authority v Hill," a familiar
statutory interpretation warhorse. The snail darter, a three-inch long,
apparently rather unimpressive species of perch, was discovered near
the site on which the Tennessee Valley Authority was building the Tellico Dam." Not long after the snail darter was discovered, the Secretary of the Interior listed it as an endangered species." The Endangered Species Act 0 (ESA) requires all federal agencies to "tak[e] such
action necessary to insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried
out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence of ... endangered species ... or result in the destruction or modification of habitat

of such species."2 1 By the time the snail darter was listed, the construction of the Tellico Dam was nearly completed, but opening the dam's
gates would have destroyed the snail darter's habitat and, it was be-

Id.
Id.
15 Easterbrook, 50 U Chi L Rev at 544 (cited in note 2).
16 For Judge Easterbrook's treatment of these issues in the context of constitutional interpretation, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U Chi L Rev 349,380 (1992).
17 437 US 153 (1978).
13
14

18 Id at 158-59.

19 Id at 161.

Endangered Species Act, Pub L No 93-205, 87 Stat 884, codified as amended at 16 USC
§ 1531 et seq.
21 TVA v Hill,437 US at 160, citing 16 USC § 1536 (1976).
20
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lieved at the time, would have jeopardized the continued existence of
the species.'
In TVA v Hill, the Supreme Court held that the language of the
ESA was clear and that it forbade the TVA from operating the dam.3
Assuming that the language was, in fact, unambiguous, is this an instance in which the legislature expressly resolved an issue, in Judge
Easterbrook's terms? There is no reason to think that Congress anticipated this very case: one involving a little-known and apparently unremarkable species of fish, on the one hand, and, on the other, an expensive, essentially completed, public works project that would have
to be rendered a white elephant in order to protect the species. (If one
wanted to be pettifogging, one could say that there is essentially no
chance that Congress anticipated a case involving, specifically, the
snail darter and the Tellico Dam, and events that occurred on the particular dates that the events of TVA v Hill occurred, and involving the
same people, and so on.) But it would be very odd to say that if this
particular constellation of circumstances never occurred to Congress,
then the ESA does not apply to the case.
Judge Easterbrook seems to address this problem by relying on
something like the ordinary meaning of words. The example he gives is
that a statute requiring that "dogs" be leashed applies only to dogs, not
to all canines, or all animals, or all dangerous animals.24 But that cannot
mean that a statute's domain extends only as far as its unambiguous
language. Justice Lewis Powell's dissenting opinion in TVA v Hill argued that the term "actions" in the ESA did not unambiguously reach
nearly completed projects like the Tellico Dam." But even if he were
right, it would be extravagant to claim that, because the ESA was ambiguous, it simply did not apply. The point of Judge Easterbrook's
project in Statutes' Domains was to try to avoid putting judges in the
position of rendering controversial (and therefore potentially erroneous) interpretations of statutes -to cut off the inquiry at the first step. If
the first step requires a judge to resolve a question like the one that
divided the majority and dissent in TVA v Hill, that would defeat the
whole purpose of having a first-stage inquiry into applicability.
So Judge Easterbrook's first criterion-"express resolution"must end up being something like: when there is no plausible underTVA v Hill,437 US at 162.
Id at 173 (stating that the language of the Endangered Species Act could not be "plainer" and "admits of no exception" in requiring that federal agencies not jeopardize the existence
of endangered species).
24 Easterbrook, 50 U Chi L Rev at 535-36 (cited in note 2).
25 TVA vHill, 437 US at 202-05 (Powell dissenting) (arguing that the term "actions" should
be construed to include only prospective actions).
22
2
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standing of the language of a statute that would address the issue in
the case, the statute is inapplicable. As Judge Easterbrook says about
the dog leashing statute, "[Miost people would say that the statute
does not go beyond dogs, because after all the verbal torturing of the
words is completed it is still too plain for argument what the statute
means." 6 That seems fair enough, but I am not sure it accomplishes
very much. If the only point of the first part of the two-stage inquiry is
to steer judges away from interpretations that most people think are
plainly wrong-"too plain for argument"-then that inquiry will hardly ever be necessary. As Judge Easterbrook said on another occasion:
Most statutes that produce litigation admit of multiple readings.... [P]eople rarely come to court with clear cases. Why spend

money butting your head against a wall? People come to court
when texts are ambiguous, or conflict, or are so old that a onceclear meaning has dimmed because of changes in the language or
legal culture.
So it remains a little unclear what Judge Easterbrook means by
"express resolution," and why it is useful to tell judges to make an
initial, first-step inquiry into applicability before they interpret a statute. If the statute fails the first step only when it is "too plain for argument" that the statute does not apply, then the judge might as well
skip the first step and just construe the statute: only one construction
is plausible. On the other hand, if the inquiry into applicability means
that the judge has to resolve a controversial question, like the one in
TVA v Hill, then requiring the judge to make that inquiry does not
reduce the likelihood of error.
Judge Easterbrook's second criterion for determining applicability asks whether the legislature has empowered the courts to develop a
body of judge-made law to implement the statute." Here again Judge
Easterbrook's point is clear. But this criterion seems to ask a question
rather than answer it. As Judge Easterbrook says,29 the standard example of such a statute is the Sherman Act. 0 Section 1 of the Sherman
Act forbids contracts in restraint of trade." All commercial contracts,
in some sense, restrain trade, and Congress could not have meant to

28

Easterbrook, 50 U Chi L Rev at 535 (cited in note 2).
Easterbrook, 57 Okla L Rev at 1 (cited in note 1).
Easterbrook, 50 U Chi L Rev at 544 (cited in note 2).

29

Id.

26
27

An Act to Protect Trade and Commerce against Unlawful Restraints and Monopolies
("Sherman Act"), 26 Stat 209 (1890), codified as amended at 15 USC §§ 1-7.
31 15 USC § 1 ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared
to be illegal.").
30
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outlaw all contracts.3 So the courts have treated the Sherman Act as
an authorization to create a complex body of judge-made law."
But the Sherman Act does not explicitly authorize the courts to
create judge-made law. That authority is, at best, an inference about
what Congress must have meant and, at worst, a deliberate reconstruction of the statute.4 The question then is: what other statutes
should be treated in more or less the same way, as the basis for a body
of judge-made law, even if (like the Sherman Act) they do not explicitly authorize judges to create such a body of law? Judge Easterbrook
does not seem to give us a way to answer that question.
The issue is raised by another famous case involving the interpre2

tation of a statute, United Steelworkers of America v Weber." Weber

held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,- which forbids racial discrimination in employment, sometimes allows an employer to
adopt a race-conscious affirmative action plan that gives a preference
to minority employees. Justice Harry Blackmun's concurring opinion
in that case (which many people believe gives the best justification for
the decision) acknowledged the difficulty of deriving that result from
the language and legislative history of Title VII.3 9 But Justice Blackmun said that "additional considerations, practical and equitable, only
partially perceived, if perceived at all, by the [enacting] Congress, support the conclusion reached by the Court today."" His argument was
that "[i]f Title VII is read literally, on the one hand [employers] face
liability for past discrimination against blacks, and on the other they
face liability to whites for any voluntary preferences adopted to mitigate the effects of prior discrimination against blacks." This "practical
problem in the administration of Title VII [was] not anticipated by
41

32
See Chicago Board of Trade v United States, 246 US 231, 238 (1918) (holding that only
those restraints of trade that destroy or suppress competition are illegal), cited in Easterbrook,
57 Okla L Rev at 6 (cited in note 1).
33
See, for example, State Oil Company v Khan, 522 US 3, 20-21 (1997) (noting the accepted view that Congress expected courts to shape antitrust laws by "recognizing and adapting
to changed circumstances and the lessons of accumulated experience"), cited in Easterbrook, 57
Okla L Rev at 6 n 16 (cited in note 1) (approving of the case as "refreshingly candid").
34 Consider United States v Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 US 290, 328 (1897)
(declining to read an exception into the Sherman Act for reasonable contracts as this would
amount to rewriting the Act's plain language).
35 443 US 193 (1979).
36 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 253, codified at 42
USC § 2000e et seq.
37 Weber, 443 US at 208.
38
See, for example, William N. Eskridge, Jr, Philip P Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett, Casesand

Materialson Legislation:Statutes and the Creationof PublicPolicy 103-04 (West 4th ed 2007).
39 Weber, 443 US at 209 (Blackmun concurring).
4o
41

Id.
Id at 210.
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Congress" ;42it was a second-generation problem that arose after the
issue that preoccupied the enacting Congress's attention-uprooting a
rigid system of racial segregation and exclusion directed at AfricanAmericans-had been brought under control.
Justice Blackmun was saying, essentially, that courts interpreting
Title VII should treat it as an authorization to do what is necessary to
construct a workable scheme of employment discrimination laws. He
was not claiming as much leeway as courts exercise under the Sherman Act, but his principle was not too different. It does not make
sense to interpret the Sherman Act to outlaw all commercial contracts,
and it does not make sense to interpret Title VII to put employers in a
position where they would be liable no matter what they did. It was
much more sensible to interpret Title VII in a way that solved an unforeseen problem that arose in the administration of that far-reaching
and ambitious statute.
Whatever one thinks about Weber and Title VII in particular, there
is a general issue here: under what circumstances should courts
attribute to Congress (or to a state legislature) an implicit instruction to
make a statute work in a sensible fashion by elaborating some principles of judge-made law? The well-established example of the antitrust
laws demonstrates that Congress need not give that instruction explicitly. On the other hand, it would go much too far to say that the courts
may routinely elaborate on statutes in this way. Perhaps the idea is to
limit this kind of judicial power to what might be called quasiconstitutional statutes that address complex problems in a way that is
intended to change the legal landscape significantly and for a long
time.43 In any event the answer is not clear.
This is, of course, not Judge Easterbrook's problem alone. But his
second criterion for determining applicability seems to present the
issue squarely. That raises questions about how useful that criterionand Judge Easterbrook's proposed first-step inquiry into applicability-will be in accomplishing his objective (everyone's objective, really) of limiting the occasions on which judges impose their own policy
views in the guise of statutory interpretation.

Id at 211.
See, for example, William N. Eskridge, Jr and John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 Duke L J
1215, 1246-48 (2001) (distinguishing between ordinary statutes, which should be construed based
on their plain language, and "super-statutes," which should be construed liberally to give effect to
the legislature's broad goals).
42

43
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III. PURPOSES AND BACKGROUND UNDERSTANDINGS
Judge Easterbrook has one clear target, in particular, in Statutes'
Domains and in his other writings on statutory interpretation. The
target is a certain kind of legal process purposivism.' It is exemplified
in one argument that might be offered for allowing implied private
damages actions-that is, for allowing private individuals to sue for
damages for the violation of a statute that, by its terms, allows only for
enforcement by a government agency. The Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act" (FDCA), for example, prohibits the marketing of drugs
without certain approvals and in certain ways.6 The United States
Food and Drug Administration and the Department of Justice are
explicitly empowered to enforce the Act.47 If an individual is injured
by conduct that violates the Act, can that individual sue for damages,
even though the Act makes no provision for such suits?
At one time, the Supreme Court generally gave an affirmative
answer to this kind of question.i In the last few decades, the Court has
turned sharply in the other direction.49 But one too-simple argument
for creating implied rights of action goes along these lines: the FDCA
(for example) has, as its purpose, protecting individuals from unsafe
drugs. Allowing private damages actions will further that purpose;
therefore such actions should be allowed. Judge Easterbrook is emphatic, and convincing, in his criticism of this argument. It makes no
sense, he says, to attribute a single purpose to any statute.so No statute
is designed to pursue a single objective no matter what the cost; every
statute acknowledges limits imposed by other objectives. The FDCA
does not require that all of the nation's resources be devoted to pro44 For the legal process approach to statutory interpretation generally (not the particular
view described in the text), see Henry M. Hart, Jr and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic

Problems in the Making and Application of Law 1111-1380 (Foundation 1994) (William N. Es-

kridge, Jr and Philip P. Frickey, eds).
45
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), Pub L No 75-717, 52 Stat 1040 (1938),
codified at 21 USC § 301 et seq.
46 See, for example, 21 USC § 355.
47
21 USC § 337(a) (requiring that enforcement proceedings be "by and in the name of the
United States").
48 See, for example, JI Case Co v Borak, 377 US 426, 435 (1964) (holding that corporate
stockholders may sue for remedial relief under the Securities Exchange Act when a merger is
authorized pursuant to deceptive proxy statements).
49
See, for example, Touche Ross & Co v Redington, 442 US 560, 568, 579 (1979) (stating
that the Court's role is "limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to create the
private right of action" under § 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and concluding that Congress did not have such an intent); Cannon v University of Chicago, 441 US 677, 718 (1979)
(Rehnquist concurring) (finding an implied private cause of action under Title IX, but cautioning
that the Court should be "extremely reluctant" to imply causes of action in the future).
50 Easterbrook, 50 U Chi L Rev at 547 (cited in note 2) ("Because legislatures comprise
many members, they do not have 'intents' or 'designs[]' ... only outcomes.").
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tecting consumers from unsafe drugs; it does not impose the most severe possible penalties on violators. It has limitations, exceptions, and
qualifications. All of these things are true of all statutes.
Beyond that, many statutes, Judge Easterbrook emphasizes, are
the products of compromise.51 In constructing such a compromise, it
will often be very useful for legislators to trade off some enforcement
in exchange for, perhaps, a broader substantive reach. If the courts
take it upon themselves to authorize a level of enforcement that the
legislative compromise has deliberately rejected, then the compromise
is undone and the legislature's power has been usurped." So the idea
behind the argument that Judge Easterbrook criticizes-the more
enforcement, the better, because it advances the purposes of the statute -is specious.

Judge Easterbrook's arguments on this point are entirely convincing. It is not clear, though, that they justify a wholesale condemnation of implied private rights of action (nor is it clear that Judge Easterbrook intends them that way, although there are passages that suggest that he does"). If Congress were to bar private rights of action
explicitly, then the courts could not create them; everyone agrees on
that. So it is all a matter of what to do when Congress is silent, and the
answer to that question should depend on the background understandings against which Congress legislates. If the governing assumption is that a regulatory law providing for public enforcement will also
authorize an implied private damages action, then, in the absence of
some special circumstance making private enforcement inappropriate,
the courts should generally create private rights of action, even without express authorization. In the era in which the courts freely created
implied rights of action, that may have been the assumption.
Judge Easterbrook's writings on interpretation are emphatic, and
clearly correct, in saying that context and background assumptions are
indispensable in interpreting statutes. He seems to have in mind assumptions that help define the meanings of words more narrowly..
But context and assumptions can govern other matters as well. In fact,
Judge Easterbrook has said as much: "Language takes meaning from
its linguistic context, but historical and governmental contexts also

5

Id at 540.

Id.
See, for example, id at 542 (discussing the regulation of tender offers, enforced by the
SEC and through criminal law, and arguing that allowing individuals to bring enforcement actions would overprotect investors by raising costs of bidding, and proposing that "a rule of noapplication" alleviates this risk).
5
Easterbrook,11 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 65 (cited in note 1).
52
53
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matter."" Every statute "calls for decision according to the legal system's accepted procedures, evidentiary rules, burdens of persuasionand defenses." Judge Easterbrook's specific point was that a criminal
statute should be understood to incorporate a necessity defense, even
though the statute did not explicitly provide for such a defense." "New
statutes fit into the normal operation of the legal system unless the
political branches provide otherwise."
The same things might be true of implied rights of action. Implied
rights of action are probably not as deeply rooted in the legal system as
is a necessity defense to a criminal charge. But an implied right of action might still be part of the "historical and governmental context,"
one of "the legal system's accepted" remedies and part of the "normal
operation of the legal system" that need not be provided explicitly." It
all depends on the background assumptions, which will not always be
easy to ascertain and which may vary from one era to the next. One
cannot say that the creation of an implied right of action is a usurpation
without accounting for those background assumptions. To that extent,
Judge Easterbrook's occasional apparent dismissiveness about implied
rights of action seems mistaken. Questions about implied private rights
of action -like questions about when courts should interpret statutes as
authority for creating judge-made law-are not so easy to answer.
IV. THE PARADOX OF STATUTES' DOMAINS

So we are left with a bit of a puzzle. Statutes' Domains says that
judges should make a threshold inquiry into whether a statute is applicable and embark on the interpretation of the statute only if the
answer is affirmative. But it is not clear what is gained by requiring
that threshold inquiry. There does not seem to be any reason to believe such an inquiry will, on the whole, produce fewer or less damaging judicial errors. The criteria for determining applicability that Judge
Easterbrook specifies either do not advance the ball (if they rule out
only cases in which it is "too plain for argument" that a statute is inapplicable) or raise issues indistinguishable from those the judge
would confront if she skipped the inquiry into applicability and just
interpreted the statute (such as the degree to which the statute au-

55 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Revisited, 112 Harv L Rev
1913, 1913 (1999).
56 Id. Judge Easterbrook's specific point was about criminal statutes, but what he said is
true of statutes generally.
57 Id at 1913-14.
58 Id at 1914.
59
Easterbrook, 112 Hary L Rev at 1913-14 (cited in note 55).
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thorizes judicial lawmaking). So what is the point of asking whether a
statute applies to a case?
One possible answer, as I suggested earlier,60 is Judge Easterbrook's premise that it is better to err on the side of finding statutes
inapplicable-it is better to leave matters unregulated by statute. At
one point in Statutes' Domains,he seems to make this premise explicit:
Those who wrote and approved the Constitution thought that
most social relations would be governed by private agreements,
customs, and understandings, not resolved in the halls of government. There is still at least a presumption that people's arrangements prevail unless expressly displaced by legal doctrine. All
61
things are permitted unless there is some contrary rule.
Adding a first-step inquiry into the applicability of a statute-instead
of just assuming that a statute applies, and proceeding to its interpretation-may or may not reduce errors, but it seems likely to bias the
set of errors towards deregulation: it will make it more likely that
judges will conclude that statutes are inapplicable, thereby leaving
matters to "people's arrangements ... [un]displaced by legal doctrine."

That seeming bias toward deregulation can arguably be found in
other places in Judge Easterbrook's writings. Take, for example, Judge
Easterbrook's emphasis (in Statutes' Domains and elsewhere) on the
fact that statutes are routinely the product of compromise among interest groups 62- an emphasis that is at the core of the public choice
approach to statutory interpretation. Judge Easterbrook insists that
judges should enforce the compromise, instead of attributing to the
statute a "purpose" that was, in fact, the purpose of only one of the
contending groups. That seems unexceptional-if the case can be decided by enforcing the compromise. But what if, with respect to the
issue before the court, it is unclear what the compromise was? Or
what if the case presents an issue (as, say, both TVA v Hill and Weber
may have presented) that was not anticipated by the parties to the
compromise? Then, Judge Easterbrook seems to say, the statute says
nothing about the issue; in the terms of Statutes' Domains, there may
be no statute that is applicable. The matter is unregulated by any federal statute.

See note 11 and accompanying text.
Easterbrook, 50 U Chi L Rev at 549-50 (cited in note 2).
62
See, for example, id at 540-41; Easterbrook, 17 Hary J L & Pub Pol at 67-68 (cited in
note 1) (providing eight propositions in support of textualism, including the assertion that legislation is a compromise, due in large part to the influence of interest groups).
63
See, for example, William N. Eskridge, Jr, Politics without Romance: Implications of
6
61

Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 Va L Rev 275,288 (1988).
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Of course, the fact that no federal statute applies does not mean
that no law applies. As Judge Easterbrook says elsewhere," if no statute resolves a case, the courts should resort to administrative agencies'
interpretations. If there is no federal law, prescribed by statute or administrative ruling, then state law governs the case. The "deregulatory"
bias in Judge Easterbrook's approach is, more precisely, a bias toward
leaving matters unregulated by federal statutes. It may easily have the
effect of leaving a subject more intensely regulated by state law.6' So
his approach is not biased in any overtly political sense-that is an
important point to make about a judge who has been as committed to
the rule of law as Judge Easterbrook is. It reflects a bias toward limiting the scope of federal statutes. Statutes' Domains, it seems, effectively creates a presumption in favor of concluding that matters lie outside the domains of federal statutes.
It is not clear that this presumption is justified. The abstract claim
that "those who wrote and approved the Constitution" favored private
orderings is surely too general, and crude, to justify it. Rhetoric about
the importance of limiting government is prominent in American traditions, of course, but it is not clear that it is more than rhetoric. More
to the point, when Congress has acted in a particular area-the protection of endangered species, or the elimination of employment discrimination, or any other area-why shouldn't the presumption be
overcome, or even reversed? Perhaps once Congress acts, the presumption should be in favor of federal regulation in that area rather
than private ordering: not, of course, to the point of extending the statute beyond what Congress has enacted, but perhaps in filling gaps or
resolving ambiguities in the statute.
Be that as it may, the net effect of Judge Easterbrook's approach
may be the opposite of what he intends. The inquiry into applicability-and the related emphasis on not going beyond the compromise
reflected in legislation-may just be additional weapons in a judge's
arsenal. Statutes' Domains urges that judges add an additional step

64
See Easterbrook, 17 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 68 (cited in note 1) ("When the text has no
answer, a court should ... go to some other source of rules, including administrative agencies,
common law, and private decision.").
65 For a vivid illustration, see Justice Clarence Thomas's concurring opinion in Wyeth v Levine, 129 S Ct 1187 (2009). The issue in that case was whether the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, and regulations issued pursuant to it, preempted a requirement, imposed by Vermont's common law of torts, that the manufacturer of a drug provide certain warnings to consumers. Id at 1193.
Justice Thomas, in an opinion that echoed many of the themes of Judge Easterbrook's writings,
argued that courts should not preempt state law on the basis of conclusions about the "purposes
and objectives" of federal law, when those purposes and objectives "are not embodied within the
text of federal law." Id at 1205. The effect of Justice Thomas's approach was to subject the manufacturer to a state regulatory regime that was more extensive than the federal regime.
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when faced with a claim that invokes a statute; the additional step may
be another opportunity for a judge's policy views to influence her decision, consciously or unconsciously. A judge who is told to focus on
the question of applicability, independent from any other issues of
statutory interpretation, has an additional temptation to indulge her
disagreement, if she has one, with the policy goals of the statute. A
judge who is told to enforce rigorously the legislative compromise, and
to take not one step further, will find it easier, if she is so inclined, to
interpret the statute too narrowly. That may be the ultimate paradox
of Judge Easterbrook's intriguing article: that an effort to limit the
power of judges may, ultimately, only empower them further.
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